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Abstract
The institutions and conduct of British industrial relations changed
fundamentally in the last decade or so.  Union membership haemorrhaged.
Management prerogatives were restored.  Management often extricated itself
from previous pluralist arrangements involving joint regulation with unions.
Under half of employees are now covered by collective agreements.  The
industrial relations environment has become harsher.  Product market
competition has intensified.  Legislative changes have undermined
collectivism.  But what of the performance outcomes?  Here the story is very
different.  The industrial relations system can no longer be held to stymie
companies' achievements.  But this is not a "transformation".  It simply reflects
compliance of labour in the conduct of workplace relations.  The impact of
changes in industrial relations institutions and conduct on the pay/jobs trade-
off are even more actutely depressing.  The pay-setting institutions have
certainly been transformed.  The government has achieved virtually all it set
out to do yet unemployment rises inexorably to a post-war record high.
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"There can be no doubt about the transformation
which has taken place in British industrial relations
in the past decade" Michael Howard, Secretary of
State for Employment, Hansard 166(39), 29 January
1990, col. 38.
"What Thatcherism appears to have produced is
neither new realism nor flexibility but a system of
workplace industrial relations with much the same
features as were previously seen as responsible for
Britain's economic decline ... there is surprisingly
little evidence of a dramatic shift of bargaining
power away from the unions" John MacInnes,
Thatcherism at Work, Open University Press 1987,
pp. 133, 136.
No consensus exists concerning the extent and consequences of change in
British industrial relations in the last decade or so.  There is no doubt that there has
been a transition away from the traditional system, although towards what is unclear.
Millward et al. (1992, summary p.6) write that "the distinctive 'system' of British
industrial relations based on collective bargaining is no longer characteristic of the
economy as a whole."  But transition towards an unknown destination is not
necessarily the same as transformation.
In what follows we examine the alterations in industrial relations structure
(institutions) and conduct (processes) in part I.  This covers unions, management,
bargaining and the environment.  In part II we analyse the links between the
modifications to the institutions/processes and the performance outcomes of the
system.  The two major outcomes concern the pay/jobs trade-off and the performance
of workplaces and companies.  These are dealt with in turn.  Much of the evidence
is taken from successive Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) covering
approximately 2,000 workplaces in 1980 (WIRS1), 1984 (WIRS2) and 1990 (WIRS3, see
Millward et al. 1992).
2I INSTITUTIONS AND CONDUCT
1 Union Presence
In 1991 37% of employees were union members (Beatson and Butcher
1993).  Union membership rose by some 3 million during the 1960s and 1970s,
reaching its zenith in 1979.  Since then it has fallen back such that in 1990
membership and density was similar to its 1960 figure (see table 1).
Profound changes in union presence occurred between 1984 and 1990.
The WIRS evidence focusses on workplaces with 25 or more employees.  Table
2 documents the decline.  The number of establishments recognizing unions
for collective bargaining fell from two thirds to one half.  Putting it another
way, by 1990 collective industrial relations were the norm for only half of
workplaces (with 25+ employees).  There is some evidence of partial or
complete derecognition in smaller workplaces, engineering, printing and
establishments which were independent of any larger organization (Gregg and
Yates 1991, Millward et al. 1992).  More important is the lack of new
recognition.  In the private sector, workplaces that were less than 10 years old
recognized unions in only 23% of cases compared with 52% of those that were
more than 20 years old.
Density fell virtually hand-in-hand with this decline in the fraction of
workplaces recognizing unions:  it waned for both manual and non-manual
workers, and for private and public services and manufacturing.  Taking a
longer perspective, the period since 1979 represents the longest ever
continuous period of declining union membership.  Future analysis of
industrial relations will have to pay far greater attention to the non-union
3sector.
Among workplaces which recognized unions the extent of multiple
unionism was unchanged for manual workers.  But among non-manuals multi-
unionism diminished, particularly in the public sector.  In 1990, focussing just
on workplaces with recognized unions, we find:
Number of recognized unions 1 2 3 4+ Mean
% of establishments 36 31 12 20 2.5
Thus only one third of establishments had single unionism and a fifth had 4
or more unions.  It is clear that "single union deals" are not as pervasive as
might be thought from the publicity and controversy they generate.  However,
an increasing proportion of workplaces with multiple unions engage in single
table bargaining (Marginson and Sisson 1990) which can be thought of as a
halfway house towards single unionism.
Closed shops represent the pinnacle of union strength.  In 1979 over 5
million workers were covered by these arrangements.  The majority were in
post-entry shops, where union membership was required once in the job.
Around 1-in-6 were in pre-entry shops where membership was required to get
a job.  Table 2 shows that this totem of union power has virtually withered
away.  And legislative changes since 1990 have outlawed all closed shops.
Union organization has also altered since 1979.  First, membership has
become more concentrated (Bird, Kirosingh and Stevens 1992).  In 1990 there
were only 287 unions, down from 453 in 1979 (and only a fifth of the peak
number of 1,384 in 1920).  4-in-5 union members now belong to a union with
over 100,000 members and 3-in-5 to one with over a quarter of a million
4members.  Second, the central union hierarchy has reasserted control over
constituent workplaces (Elgar and Simpson 1993), largely to ensure that union
funds are not put at risk from unlawful industrial relations acts.  Third, union
finances are a cause for concern.  Willman (1990) terms unions' net worth
(assets minus liabilities) as a multiple of spending the "acid test" measure
because it indicates how long a union could operate if it had no revenue
coming in.  This indicator has consistently declined in the post-war period.
Explanations for shrinking union influence have exercised industrial
relations academics and other scholars.  A full treatment would require a
separate paper.  Instead, the focus here is more narrow, on density.  The
intersection of Thatcherite policies with long-run trends is the cause of lower
trade union membership.  More specifically, density has contracted because of
the complex interaction of five factors:  macroeconomic variables; labour force
composition; and policies of the state, employers and unions themselves.
Carruth and Disney (1988) examined movements in density from 1896
to 1984.  They found that, when unemployment and real wage growth were
high relative to trend, this exerted a depressing influence on density.  They
went as far as to state that: "the downturn in membership [in the 1980s] is
entirely a cyclical phenomenon."  This seems a bit strong.  Further, the slow-
down in real wage growth and rapid fall in unemployment 1988-90 should --
according to business cycle theory -- have caused membership to increase, but
it did not.
Composition arguments are deceptively seductive.  The probability of
belonging to a union is higher for full-timers than part-timers, men than
5women, manuals than non-manuals, in manufacturing than in services, in large
workplaces than in small ones, in northern Britain than in southern.  Therefore,
so the argument runs, because the mix of jobs and workers moved
unfavourably with respect to union membership on all counts, membership
was bound to decline.  Booth (1989) ascribes nearly half the decline in density
1980-86 to such composition effects.  This begs two questions.  First, most of
the trends noted above were in operation in the 1970s when membership rose
rapidly.  Second, why have unions not been able to get recognized, organise
and recruit in expanding areas of employment?
The legislative onslaught against unions was forcefully advanced by
Freeman and Pelletier (1990).  They analysed fluctuations in density 1948-86.
The control variables included macroeconomic variables, industry composition,
and the political complexion of the government.  The authors calculated a
"legislation index" according to how favourable or unfavourable various
strands of labour law were to unions in each year.  Changes in the law were
held to be "responsible for the entire decline" in density levels - clearly
inconsistent with the identical claim of Carruth and Disney concerning
macroeconomic factors.
Employer policies towards unions are crucial.  Recognition is the
fulcrum on which membership moves.  In the WIRS panel, de-recognitions
were twice as likely as new recognitions 1984-90.  Encouragement of human
resource management among employees in unionised workplaces (see Section
2) has further undermined the traditional collective approach to industrial
6relations.
Finally, unions' own policies surely count.  In recent years, many unions
have adopted a "market share" approach.  They have attempted via mergers,
amalgamations and transfers of engagements to boost their share of a declining
pool.  This may well be a sensible defensive tactic, but it does not boost
aggregate membership.  It is noteworthy that the most successful union in the
1980s -- The Royal College of Nursing -- trebled its membership to 300,000 by
emphasising its professional ethos and exclusive craft status.
 2 Management
"The main feature of industrial relations in the 1980s was that managers
were firmly in charge."  So conclude Kessler and Bayliss (1992) in their
exhaustive study of industrial relations in the last quarter of a century.  The
ascent of management cannot be quantified in the way that the decline of
union organisation is measurable.  But certain features of management practice
during the 1980s and 1990s stand out.  Dunn (1993) shows how management
has frequently de-incorporated itself from previous pluralist practices
involving joint regulation with unions.  This de-incorporation is associated
with greater decentralization, a spread of human resource management
practices and changes to the substantive clauses in collective bargaining.
Consequent upon the findings of the Donovan (1968) Report into our
industrial relations, "management 'sponsorship' of shop stewards in the 1970s
became the vogue ... previously feeble stewards found themselves with the
procedural wherewithal to do something to satisfy their members' demands"
(Dunn 1993).  Studying over 50 companies in 1979, Dunn traces how a 'live
7and let live' principle evolved such that managerial ambition was stunted and
its imagination unionised.  In surveys in the 1970s managers generally stated
they were content, but this was because "stewards defined the terms of the
truce and management rationalised their compliance."  When he revisited these
companies in 1990-91 he noted the re-assertion of managerial prerogative.  This
was not simply a consequence of greater product market competition and
higher unemployment.  Rather it had involved great effort - not just getting
rid of restrictive working practices, but "breaking the routine of conforming
with bargaining rituals and of deferring to steward power."
One such ritual that was ruptured was multi-employer bargaining.
Purcell (1991) shows that the 1980s witnessed the culmination of the process
of collapse of multi-employer bargaining and simultaneous decentralization to
local units.  Further, "it is extremely rare for the trade unions to have initiated
the restructuring of collective bargaining.  In most cases they have opposed it,
unsuccessfully."  This decentralisation of management is evidenced by the fact
that membership of employers organisations halved between 1980 and 1990.
Although some decentralisation was going on before 1980 its pace
accelerated around then.  Management experts such as Purcell indicate that the
dominant force for this change in industrial relations is the "development of
business policies and corporate strategies concerned with the structure, shape,
and control systems of the firm which have forced personnel and industrial
relations managers, often reluctantly, to restructure collective bargaining."  This
is especially the case with large enterprises which dominate the British
economy to a greater extent than in other OECD countries.
8While the change to decentralised management is self-evident, there is
more debate concerning the extent to which it has been accompanied by
human resource management (HRM).  Evidence from WIRS3 (Millward et al.
1992) shows that HRM practices are on the increase, but that -- paradoxically --
they are more prevalent in union than in non-union workplaces (see Sisson
1993 for further details).
The decline in union density and recognition was outlined in section 1.
Workplace-level joint consultation committees provide an alternative
mechanism to conduct collective industrial relations.  The fraction of
workplaces with such arrangements rose in the 1970s, but these committees
have also been in decline subsequently:
% of workplaces with JCC
1984 1990
Union Workplaces 41 37
Non-union Workplaces 21 19
All Workplaces 34 29
Thus there is no evidence that JCCs have filled the institutional vacuum left
by the decay in collective bargaining.
By contrast "individual" practices - usually thought of as components
of HRM - are spreading.  Examples include team briefings -- now regularly
used by nearly half of all workplaces, and line managers spending more time
on personnel matters.
Possibly more important are the changes in payment systems (see table
93).  There was no overall increase in payments-by-results between 1984 and
1990 but it is notable that one-third of establishments had some form of merit
pay -- dependent on the subjective judgment of a supervisor or manager -- by
1990.  Profit sharing schemes and ESOPs both expanded.
However, these "individual" elements in pay probably account for only
a tiny fraction of the total wage bill.  In 1990 a third of establishments had an
ESOP and in these workplaces a third of employees participated (see table 3).
If the ESOP accounted for, say, 10% of total pay, this implies that ESOPs total
only around 1% of the aggregate British private sector wage bill.  If merit pay
and profit sharing represent similar fractions it can be readily seen that these
HRM elements have a shallow hold.
Contents of collective agreements provide one indication of the tilt in
the balance of power towards management in the 1980s and 1990s.  Such
analysis confirms that it is vital not to associate procedural stability with a lack
of dynamism in industrial relations.  Wright (1993) has studied over 100 such
agreements for the same 50 companies operating in 1979 and 1990.  He found
that procedural clauses were rather robust:  clauses relating to statements of
intent and the parties recognized had changed little.  There were some
procedural extensions concerning dispute resolution, check-off and shop
steward constituencies and time off.  Closed shop clauses were the most likely
to be deleted, although in the majority of cases they remained extant.  It is
noteworthy that there was virtually no extension of "new style deal"
procedures incorporating clauses covering, for example, co-operative
statements of intent, single status, and final offer arbitration to resolve
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disputes.
By contrast, there was a noticeable shift in the substantive clauses
towards greater flexibility of work organization.  Sometimes such flexibility
was achieved via formalisation of more flexible job descriptions but more often
the 1990 clauses emphasised managerial prerogative in determining job tasks.
3. Collective bargaining
The diminution of unionisation and developments in managerial
practices outlined above leads naturally to a consideration of changes in the
coverage, structure and quality of collective bargaining.
Official attitudes towards collective bargaining have altered dramatically
over the past quarter of a century.  Brown (1993) - from where the following
quotes are taken - charts these views.  The Royal Commission on Trade
Unions and Employers Associations 1965-68 stated:
"Properly conducted, collective bargaining is the most effective means of
giving workers the right to representation in decisions affecting their working
lives.  While therefore the first task in the reform of British industrial relations
is to bring greater order into collective bargaining in the company and plant,
the second is to extend the coverage of collective bargaining and the
organization of workers on which it depends."  (Donovan 1968 para 212).
Yet 24 years later we find the Secretary of State for Employment reporting to
Parliament that:
"Traditional patterns of industrial relations, based on collective bargaining and
collective agreements, seem increasingly inappropriate and are in decline."
(Cm. 1810, para 1.15).
Donovan certainly got its wish to extend collective bargaining during
the 1970s but subsequently the coverage of collective agreements decayed
rapidly, particularly in the second half of the 1980s.  Brown (1993) assembled
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these figures from a variety of sources:
% of all employees covered by
collective agreements
----------------------------------------------
1968 65
1973 72
1984 64
1990 47
Collective bargaining is also now the norm in only a minority of workplaces
and it has ebbed in importance in both private manufacturing and services and
in the public sector in the last decade  (table 4). Where pay in the private
sector is still determined by collective bargaining two features stand out.  First,
multi-employer bargaining has decayed.  But, second, there is also less
fragmentation of internal company bargaining.
Many multi-employer ("national") agreements have collapsed or been
greatly reduced in influence or coverage since 1986 (Brown and Walsh 1991).
Examples include engineering, buses, banking, cotton textiles, independent
television, food retailing and manufacturing, docks, cement, newspapers,
merchant shipping and wholesale meat. Around half of all employees in the
private sector have their pay determined by collective bargaining, and, of
these, 4-in-5 are now covered by single employer bargaining.
This decentralisation has not, however, extended to workplace level.
Rather the reverse.  Most multi-plant employers bargain at division rather than
workplace level so moderating the fragmentation of bargaining inside the firm.
And where there is decentralisation to the workplace -- perhaps to be
congruent with profit-related product centres -- "companies have tended to
introduce higher level co-ordination of ostensibly decentralised pay control
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points"  (Brown and Walsh 1991).  Thus the switch away from multi-employer
negotiations has gone hand-in-hand with the extension of negotiating
structures at enterprise or company level.
This corporate control of decentralised bargaining is potentially
important.  It has been asserted that greater co-ordination of pay bargaining
is required to improve the macroeconomic trade-off between pay and jobs
(Layard 1990, Soskice 1990).  Leaving aside the merits of the case for co-
ordination, some critics have suggested it is an impossible dream consequent
on the decentralisation of pay bargaining (see, e.g. the debate in IRS
Employment Trends 485, 5 April 1991).  This criticism is probably wrong.
Although the number of "pay control points" -- a more useful concept here
than bargaining groups -- rose when multi-employer bargaining collapsed, this
increase was partially offset by the lower degree of fragmentation of
bargaining inside the company.  If it were held to be desirable, co-ordination
could probably be achieved by focussing on the largest 100 or so private sector
companies.
The quality of collective bargaining encompasses (Brown 1993) the
degree of union security provided by employers, the depth of union
involvement in the administration of bargaining, the scope of bargaining, and
the degree of control exercised by collective agreements.  The evidence is
mixed.
We have already seen that union security has waned.  Where collective
bargaining remains unions are still deeply involved through shop stewards,
office facilities and check-off.  However, as Brown (1993)  points out, this
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could represent either union strength or weakness -- workplace organization
being dependent on management for legitimacy and other resources.  The
scope of bargaining contracted between 1980 and 1990 such that fewer issues
were subject to joint regulation.  Finally, single employer bargaining --
accompanied by greater procedural formality -- has greatly increased the
degree of control of agreements on both pay and non-pay matters.
Considerable disagreement exists concerning the factors underpinning
pay determination (Blanchflower and Oswald 1988).  Those who emphasise
bargaining -- one version of which is the 'insider-outsider' theory -- stress the
importance of the company's own economic and financial performance.  In this
approach, pay is set, in large part, by how well the employer is doing.By
contrast, the competitive (or classical) theory stresses that the wage cannot be
controlled by either the employer or the worker.  As Blanchflower and Oswald
put it (p. 364): "The going rate of pay is fixed by conditions in the whole
economy, and most especially by the total demand for and supply of labour.
Each firm must pay the going rate.  It has no need to raise wages when its
productivity increases or its sales boom; if it did so it would be inundated
with applicants from other sectors.  In this kind of world 'insiders' have no
power."  In general, industrial relations specialists prefer the bargaining
approach while many economists emphasise competition (though in recent
years some economists have been stressing the importance of institutions, see
e.g. Blanchflower et al. 1990, Carruth and Oswald 1987).
WIRS3 provides excellent information on this debate (Millward et al.
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table 7.11).  Pay setting is influenced by both competitive pressures and by
bargaining.  Typically, labour market factors like recruitment and retention
and a link to other settlements -- the going rate -- emphasise the importance
of competition.  But the economic performance of the workplace or company
is mentioned just as often as labour market factors, and given equal weight in
both the union and non-union sectors.  Further, 'individual performance' is
mentioned by a substantial fraction of managers in non-union workplaces.
This WIRS3 evidence supports -- for both union and non-union labour markets
-- Blanchflower and Oswald's statement (p. 367), using information from
WIRS2, that "these results are difficult to reconcile with the wage taking firm
of classical theory."
This evidence on the extent, structure and quality of collective
bargaining confirms the views of Millward and his co-authors concerning the
aims and achievements of successive governments since 1979:  "Government
policy, both through its dealings with its own employees and through
persuasion and advocacy to other employers, encouraged a move away from
national, multi-employer pay settlements towards more locally determined
ones which were more sensitive to local labour markets and the circumstances
of the employer" (Millward et al. 1992 p. 217).  The objective has been
accomplished.  Whether this has improved the outcomes of the industrial
relations system - particularly concerning pay and jobs - will be examined in
part II.
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4. Environment
The environment in which industrial relations are conducted is sharply
different now from what it was in the decade following the Donovan Report
in 1968.  There are three main elements.  First, the composition of the
workforce has altered and high unemployment casts a fearful shadow.
Second, unionised firms now face much greater international and domestic
competition than previously.  Third, the state has mounted a sustained attack
on collectivism.  The legislative onslaught against unions is the best known
component of this assault, but there are others including privatisation,
contracting-out and the withdrawal of collective bargaining for many public
sector workers.  It is probably the combination of these three environmental
factors which has contributed to the changes in outcomes discussed in part II.
At the time of the Donovan Report, employees in employment
accounted for 89% of the total workforce; that figure now is 75%.  Then,
women represented a little over one-third of employees; now they account for
nearly half.  In the 1960s 2-employees-in-5 were in manufacturing, twice
today's proportion.  There has also been a substantial increase in part-timers,
self-employed and those on temporary contracts.  And, sadly, each successive
peak of unemployment reaches a new higher total.  This unemployment "fear
factor" has had a real impact on industrial relations practice.
Many trading companies -- and particularly those with a strong union
presence -- have experienced more intense product market competition in the
1980s and 1990s.  Exchange controls were removed in 1979.  The exchange rate
was seriously overvalued in the early 1980s and early 1990s forcing exporters
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and import-competing companies to improve their unit labour costs or go out
of business.  State subsidies to lame duck, monopolistic, highly unionized
firms were simply axed.  This applied particularly to firms with predominantly
male workforces in coal, steel, cars, shipbuilding and aerospace, where
subsidies had reached record levels in the late 1970s.
It is also possible to point to instances where cosy cartels between
management and unions to boost their own profits and pay at the expense of
the consumer have been breached almost overnight, leading to amazing
adjustments in work practices.  Proposals (now implemented) to auction,
rather than to allocate by committee, the franchises to operate commercial TV
networks undermined the monopoly position of the TV companies and unions.
Imminent competition from the channel tunnel breached the cross-channel
ferry duopoly leading to changed work patterns among seamen.  And new
technology permitted new entry into national and provincial newspaper
production, causing changes in working practices and contracts among craft
workers, general workers and journalists.  In each of these three cases the
unions -- all of which previously operated closed shops -- were vanquished in
the bitter industrial disputes which accompanied the ending of the old regime.
Industrial relations legislation passed between 1980-93 is summarised
in Dunn and Metcalf (1993).  Its thrust has been to undermine collectivism by
promoting individual responsibility, voice, exit from collective decision and
organization and loyalty to the organization.  At the start of the 1980s,
statutory union recognition procedures were in place (albeit rather ineffective),
a firm could not isolate itself from a dispute in which it was not involved, and
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unions as organisations were completely immune from tortious liability.  Now,
this position is very different.  It is up to the firm to decide whether or not to
recognize a trade union.  That union has a legal personality, so the firm can
get injunctions and damages against the union itself.  The definition of a trade
dispute attracting immunity has been successively reined back:  it must be
between workers and their own employer, subject to majority support at the
workplace in a secret ballot and not designed to foster or maintain a closed
shop.  The firm can use the courts to insulate itself from secondary action and
can selectively dismiss unofficial strikers. 
State sponsored routes to spread the effects of collective bargaining have
all been withdrawn.  The century-old Fair Wage Resolutions which ensured
workers employed by firms undertaking public contracts were paid the rate
for the job were rescinded in 1982.  Previously, in 1980, the comparability
machinery under Schedule 11 of the 1975 Employment Protection Act was
abolished.  The Wage Council system was also narrowed in scope to exclude
young workers and is about to be abolished.
In a nutshell, where a union is recognized the legislation has made the
firm and the union responsible for their own workplace industrial relations
and where there is no union it is now harder to organize than previously.  The
narrowed definition of a trade dispute and outlawing of secondary action can
be thought of as encouraging "company unionism".  Employees' commitment
to the company might be enhanced further by provisions in the 1982 Act
which oblige the company to state in its Annual Report its policy on
information, consultation and employee involvement, and by various measures
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in successive budgets which have encouraged profit sharing and employee
share ownership schemes, discussed in section 2.
The "voice" of the individual member, relative to that of the activist and
union official, has been given a boost through the various secret ballot
provisions.  Ballots are required prior to industrial action, for elections of
union executive members and to decide whether a union be permitted to hold
funds for political activity.  Further, the individual union member can restrain
the union from calling them to take industrial action which has not been
supported by a majority in a secret ballot.  All these strands require the official
union hierarchy to exercise more control over their shop stewards at
workplace level.  Perhaps the most potentially far-reaching element of
individual voice is the establishment of a Commissioner for the Rights of
Trade Union Members.  A disaffected union member can apply to the
Commissioner to use public funds for court proceedings against the union, or
for the Commissioner herself to take on the case on the member's behalf.  No
comparable arrangements exist for disaffected shareholders or golf club
members.
Exit has been made easier for both individuals and firms.  The assault
against the closed shop culminated by outlawing post-entry closed shops in
1988 and pre-entry closed shops in 1990.  Now, it is wholly a matter of
individual choice to belong or not to belong to a union, although it is in the
employer's gift to decide whether a union will be recognized.  An individual
union member can also exit from a dispute:  he or she can continue working
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even in the face of an overwhelming majority in a secret ballot in favour of
industrial action and the union is impotent to discipline that member.  The
weakening of the "floor of individual employment rights" also means that the
firm can more easily exit from the employment contract.  For example, a
worker does not benefit from unfair dismissal provisions until he or she has
been with the company for two years, four times longer than in 1979. 
It is now necessary to evaluate how reduced union presence, the
harsher climate, and the other alterations to managerial strategy, tactics and
bargaining structures influenced the performance outcomes of the system.
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II OUTCOMES
5 Pay and Jobs
Modifications to unions and to the industrial relations system set out in
part I can have, at least, three different influences on pay.  First, the pay
structure can be modified via changes in the pay differential achieved by
unionised employees compared with their non-union counterparts.  Second,
the distribution of pay can be altered through union activity.  Third, the
industrial relations system might affect the rate of growth of nominal and/or
real pay.  These issues are considered in turn.  In each case the related
implications concerning jobs are also discussed.
There is now general agreement that, on average, unionised workplaces
pay higher wages than otherwise comparable non-union ones.  Fortunately,
successive WIRSs, and other surveys, permit us to go well beyond this bald
statement.  We now know how the structure of bargaining influences the
union/non-union differential; how this differential responds to changes in the
bargaining environment like increased competition or anti-union laws; and
how the differential varies by demographic characteristics --- which permits
us to gauge the impact of unions on equality.
Semi-skilled employees in workplaces where a union is recognized for
collective bargaining earned, on average in 1984, around 8% more than their
counterparts in non-union workplaces (see table 5).  But this "average" conceals
as much as it reveals.  In particular, we need to unravel it to 
examine the union effects associated with different density levels, closed
shops, and with multiple or single unionism.
21
In workplaces without a closed shop, high density (above 95%) was
required in 1984 to get the wage premium associated with recognition.  When
unions were recognized, but density was below 95%, the workplace paid no
more than the corresponding non-union workplace.  Where there was a closed
shop, the post-entry variety yielded no extra, over and above simple
recognition with 95% plus density.  By contrast, the pre-entry closed shop was
a separate institutional form.  The wage premium gained by those in the pre-
entry closed shop was roughly double that for recognition alone.
The respective merits of multiple versus single unionism in a workplace,
whether from the management or union standpoint, has long been a matter of
debate (see for example Donovan Report paras. 672-691).  Secondary analysis
from WIRS2 provides evidence on this issue.  Multiple unions which bargain
separately achieve a significantly larger pay premium than both multiple
unions which bargain jointly (often called "single-table" bargaining) and single
unions.  However, multiple unions with single-table bargaining and single
unions have identical wage premia over non-union workplaces.  
Until recently the link between the product market and the labour
market was rather neglected.  Stewart (1990) helps to rectify this omission in
the case of pay.  In the vast majority of establishments facing competitive
product market conditions, unions are unable to achieve wage levels above
those paid elsewhere to comparable non-union workers.  Likewise they cannot
create differentials over non-union pay in establishments which operate
primarily in international markets -- foreign competition restrains union
influence.  By contrast, in establishments in firms with market power there is
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considerably greater scope for unions to achieve pay levels significantly above
those paid to comparable non-union workers, especially where a pre-entry
closed shop is present.  It is monopoly power in the product market of the
firm that provides a rent ("surplus") and unions are able to bargain a share of
these super-normal profits.
There is less evidence concerning changes in this pay structure.  The
weight of what little there is points to a decline in the union mark-up.  Ingram
(1991) uses the CBI pay databank to show that, in every year except one, 1979-
1989 pay increases in unionised bargaining groups were lower than their non-
union counterparts.  The cumulative fall in the differential was 4%.  Gregg and
Machin (1992) undertook their own survey of nearly 300 firms employing
some 2m workers and concluded that, in the 1980s, unionised firms
experienced slower wage growth than non-union firms and that "this is
consistent with an erosion of the average union/non-union wage differential
in these firms over the late 1980s."  Stewart (1992) analysed workplace data
from WIRS2 (1984) and WIRS3 (1990).  The average union differential (for
semi-skilled workers) fell from 0.088 to 0.062, with a particularly noticeable
collapse in the previous mark-up gained by those in pre-entry closed shops.
The panel data (537 establishments) tell the same story:
23
Wage Growth 1984-90
Change in Log Median Wage (mid point)
Weighted Means
Overall Mean .40
No recognition in 1984 .42
Recognition in 1984 .37
No recognition in 1990 .28
Recognition in 1990 .38
Thus pay rises were greater in workplaces where unions were not recognized
than where they are.  Further, where de-recognition occurred between 1984
and 1990 the pay rise was even lower.  The differential based on industry data
first estimated by Layard, Metcalf and Nickell (1978) was also lower in the
second half of the 1980s than in the first half (but this series is less robust than
that based on other data).
When the union wage differential is calculated from data on individuals
it appears, in contrast to the above evidence, to be roughly stable.  This holds
for studies based on both the British Social Attitudes Survey (Blanchflower
1991) and the Family Expenditure Survey (Symons and Walker 1988).
The bulk of the evidence -- both in terms of data sources and number
of studies -- therefore points to a decline in the union/non-union pay
differential since 1980.  What effect should this have on employment?  Minford
(1983) and Hayek (1984) argued that prior to 1980 pay in union workplaces
was boosted by immunities and the closed shop.  This, they said, lowered
employment in the union sector.  In turn, displaced labour put downward
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pressure on pay in the non-union sector making work less attractive relative
to unemployment benefit, resulting in higher unemployment.  They proposed,
therefore, lower unemployment pay, the elimination of various immunities
enjoyed by unions in connection with their activities and the outlawing of the
closed shop.  This, it was held, would reduce the union mark-up with
beneficial effects on employment levels.  Minford and Hayek seem to have got
their wish - their prescriptions were enacted and the union differential is lower
now than in 1980.  Alas, the favourable predicted employment effects have not
emerged.  Rather the reverse:  employment is lower in the union sector than
in 1980 and aggregate unemployment has at least doubled.
Blanchflower, Millward and Oswald (1991) explain the lack of success
on the jobs front - given that the Hayek-Minford prescriptions have been
followed - by suggesting that unions have (in addition to a positive wage
differential) a negative impact on employment growth in the private sector.
They state that this differential is -3% a year: unionised workplaces lose 3%
more jobs or gain 3% fewer jobs, each year, than their non-union counterparts.
Their article produced an acrimonious academic exchange (see Machin and
Wadhwani 1991a).  It is plausible that it is not really possible to estimate the
dynamic impact of unions on jobs from the cross-section (WIRS1 and 2) data
used by the protagonists.  Further, the -3% differential on employment growth
is presumably time-specific (in their case 
1980-84).  Thus, Millward et al. (1992, p. 322) argue that any such adverse
effect was attenuated 1984-90.
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Unions are a force for pay equality -- they have a "sword of justice"
effect.  The pay distribution is less dispersed for union than for non-union
workers.  And union activity narrows the wage structure as between females
and males, disabled and able-bodied, blacks and whites, manuals and non-
manuals (Metcalf 1982).  The ebbing of union strength has been associated
with a huge increase in the inequality in pay among both individuals and
workplaces between 1980 and 1990 (Gosling and Machin 1992, Schmitt 1993).
For example, Gosling and Machin show that across establishment inequality
was much greater in 1990 than in 1980.  The decline in the share of plants with
recognized unions accounts for a fifth of the coincident rise in earnings
inequality.  Further, within-establishment wage inequality increased in both
union and non-union plants, but far more in the latter.  This implies that the
pay-equalising effects of unions became more marked through the decade.
The growing inequality in pay occurred during the decade in which
unemployment twice topped 3m.  The promotion of inequality has patently
failed to deliver the aggregate employment goods.  Further, the unemployment
rate of 18- and 19-year olds, who were removed from Wage Council coverage
in 1986 because it was held that the Councils were pricing them out of jobs,
is unchanged relative to the all-age rate.  It seems that the causal relationship
runs from higher unemployment to greater inequality rather than vice versa.
The third interaction between the industrial relations system and pay
and jobs concerns the break-up of the traditional system of industrial relations.
There are fewer workers covered by collective bargaining, such bargaining is
more decentralised, pay is more sensitive to individual and workplace
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performance and to local labour market conditions than previously.  This
could provide one explanation of an enduring puzzle of the 1980s (Carruth
and Oswald 1989).  Despite higher unemployment, the growth in competition
and the legislative onslaught against unions, real wages grew faster than at
any other time in the post-war period (Bayliss 1993).  The insiders changed
their work practices (Ingram 1991), and the efficiency, productivity and profits
of their establishments were given a boost, at least in manufacturing.  The
insiders got their reward in the form of higher real earnings.  But
simultaneously the number of outsiders - the unemployed - was growing.
Millward et al. (1992) demonstrate (table 7.11) that the labour market is not
wholly competitive - ability to pay, profitability, and productivity growth all
matter too.  In these circumstances the outsiders exercise less influence on the
process of pay determination than previously.  So successively higher levels
of unemployment are required to control wage inflation.
6 Company and Workplace Performance
Connections between the industrial relations system and three
dimensions of company and workplace performance - productivity,
profitability and investment - are examined here.  In each case we examine
how the links have varied over time.
(a) Productivity
Alterations in the institutions and conduct of industrial relations
outlined in part I contributed to two noteworthy, interrelated features of
British productivity performance in the 1980s.  First, growth in manufacturing
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output per head improved such that Britain was top of the OECD-major 7
nations growth league table in the 1980s, after being bottom in both the 1960s
and 1970s.  Labour productivity in manufacturing has continued to grow
rapidly in the 1990s (some 4% p.a.) reflecting the sharper fall in employment
than output.  Second, averaged over the 1980s, unionised workplaces,
companies and industries had a superior productivity growth record than their
non-union counterparts.
The improved productivity performance of the manufacturing sector in
the 1980s was attributable to the interaction of greater product market
competition, high unemployment and anti-union legislation (Metcalf 1990).
Crafts (1993) recently echoed these findings.  In the most comprehensive
review yet of manufacturing industry in recent times he writes:  "Better
performance came from an intensification of competitive pressures on
management, a weakening of trade union bargaining power and a retreat from
the unsuccessful interventionist policies of the 1960s and 1970s.  There was a
substantial shake-out of inefficiencies which had previously been allowed to
persist" (pp. 76-77).  As a consequence of this turnaround in UK performance
the gap between the level of labour productivity in Britain and in other
countries was narrowed (Crafts 1993, table 6):
Manufacturing Output per person Employed (UK = 100)
USA/UK Germany/UK France/UK
1977 230 149 138
1989 177 105 112
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Unionised workplaces, companies and industries contributed
disproportionately to the reversal in the aggregate productivity growth
performance of manufacturing.  In the second half of the 1970s productivity
growth was lower in unionised companies than in non-union companies
(Nickell et al. 1992).  This resulted in such unionised firms having, on average,
a lower level of labour productivity than their non-union counterparts around
1980, particularly in large workplaces with a closed shop (Machin 1991a).
Then during the 1980s unionised companies narrowed, and quite possibly
eliminated or even reversed, the favourable productivity edge previously
enjoyed by non-union companies (Gregg et al. 1993).
It is likely that the differential growth in unionised workplaces and
companies in the first part of the 1980s was mainly a consequence of changes
in work organisation.  For example, Machin and Wadhwani (1991) referring
to 1981-84 state that "unionised plants were more likely to have experienced
a change in work practices because they are more likely to have restrictions on
managerial discretion vis a vis restrictive practices in the first place."
However, the re-assertion of managerial prerogative did not stop at the
conduct of industrial relations.  It has also influenced the institutions
themselves.  Dunn and Wright (1993), after extensive detailed case studies,
describe the closed shop as "moribund".  Gregg and Yates (1991) note the
extensive, albeit usually partial, de-recognition of unions for collective
bargaining in the second half of the 1980s.  Purcell (1991) captures these
changes when he writes -- on the basis of his case studies -- that "the
constraints on management action, traditionally reflected and reinforced
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through the institutions and procedures of industrial relations, especially
collective bargaining, have been significantly weakened."  Gregg et al. (1993)
show why these modifications to the structure of industrial relations matter.
Productivity growth 1985-1989 was higher in companies which recognised
unions in 1985 than it was in non-union companies.  But it was still higher
where there had been a change in the union institutions -- rescinding a
previous union membership agreement (closed shop) and/or full or partial de-
recognition.  They conclude that "the visible evidence of changes in union
status probably acts as a signal to the workforce of a greater assertiveness on
the part of management."
It must be emphasised that much of the productivity growth in the
1980s -- particularly in unionised workplaces and companies -- flowed from
unrepeatable sources.  The conduct of industrial relations was changed by, for
example, alterations to working practices.  The institutions were modified in
places by rescinding union membership agreements or by de-recognition of the
union for collective bargaining purposes.  The higher growth rates of the last
decade can only be sustained in the future by either greater investment in
physical and human capital or a change in the rules of the game away from
adversarial towards co-operative industrial relations.  Paradoxically, this offers
hope.  Past failures -- underinvestment and a reliance by management on
compliance rather than co-operation -- imply considerable scope for future
productivity growth.
(b) Profitability
Unanimity exists in the 8 UK studies which use workplaces, firms or
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industries to analyse the link between profitability and industrial relations:  all
show a significant negative association between unionisation and financial
performance or profitability.  WIRS data are used in 3 studies, summarised in
table 6.  In two further studies the firm is the unit of observation (Cable and
Machin 1991; Machin 1991) while industry data are used in Conyon and
Machin (1991) and Dowrick (1990).  One study (Geroski et al. 1991) mixes
industry-level industrial relations indicators with firm level financial data.
It will be seen from table 6 that both union recognition and the closed
shop are linked with a greater likelihood of below average performance.
Possibly more interesting are the findings of Machin et al. (1992) concerning
multi-unionism.  Among unionised manufacturing workplaces, multiple
unionism with single table bargaining generates a similar financial
performance to a single union environment..  However, when multiple
unionism is accompanied by separate bargaining arrangements, financial
performance is significantly worse.
The crucial question concerning this apparent link between industrial
relations institutions and financial performance is:  does it matter in the long
run?  If all we are observing is a shift in the distribution from capital to labour
-- from profits to pay -- many would say "so much the better."  But if the
lower profitability results in less investment in research and development and
in physical and human capital this will damage the dynamic prospects of the
workplace and company.  It would also tend to lead to a worse performance
on job creation than would otherwise be the case.
There is tentative evidence that what we are observing is largely a
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matter of equity between labour and capital and that it has few implications
concerning long run economic senescence.  The first batch of evidence
concerns the profitability studies themselves.  The second relates to the link
between industrial relations systems and investment rates.
Cable and Machin (1991) conclude that the profitability results are
simply the mirror image of the well-known results on the union wage
differential.  High density or the closed shop or multi-unionism generates a
wage differential compared with otherwise similar non-union workers, but it
does not lower profitability over and above this labour cost effect.  There is
increasing evidence that the union wage differential is associated with some
degree of monopoly power in the product market (see e.g. Stewart 1990, Gregg
and Machin 1992).  This, in turn, implies that unions are simply creaming off
some of the firms' super-normal profits in the form of higher pay.  Such a line
of reasoning is reinforced by the studies of Machin and Stewart (1991), Machin
(1991) and Conyon and Machin (1991) which each find that unions only lower
financial performance, ceteris paribus, where the firm has some product market
power.
It appears, provisionally, that this link between unionisation and
financial performance became weaker as the 1980s progressed.  Millward et al.
present a cross-tabulation (from table 3.4) which shows:
Financial Performance compared Average Union
with other workplaces in the Density (%)
same industry 1984 1990
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lots better 29 33
A little better 44 37
About average 45 35
A little below average 52 40
Lots below average 74 63
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Although average union density in workplaces reporting below average
performance remains higher than it is in those reporting above average
performance, the association is less pronounced in 1990 than it was in 1984.
(c) Investment
Capital accumulation is the key to long run growth.  Therefore, the
impact of our industrial relations system on investment -- in new technology,
process and product innovation, research and development and in human
capital -- is of vital importance.  The Department of Employment (1981, para.
1) has asserted that "For at least a generation now our industrial relations have
failed us because they have ... acted as a disincentive to investment and
discouraged innovation."  That pronouncement is scrutinised here.
Unfortunately the only evidence relates to the impact of various
characteristics of unions on investment.  This is a pity.  The evidence is
ambiguous and, anyway, it is plausible that the propensities of management
dominate the investment decision.
Any link between unionisation and investment is an empirical matter
because the theoretical arguments cut both ways.  On the one hand, union
pressure on pay will cause firms to invest more heavily so as to reduce their
need for expensive labour.  On the other hand, union presence might lower
investment directly or indirectly.  The direct effect occurs if a union delays the
installation of new machinery or operates inflexible work rules inhibiting the
full use of the investment.  Any indirect effect is less easy to spot.  When a
company invests in a new project, unionised workers may capture ("tax") some
of the returns in the form of higher pay because, once the capital is installed
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or the R and D done, the process cannot easily be reversed thereby weakening
the company's bargaining position.
The evidence is conflicting.  In very broad terms cross-section evidence
from workplaces, firms and industries suggests that unionised organisations
have a superior investment performance to their non-union counterparts.  By
contrast, time series evidence tentatively suggests that unions have a
depressing effect on investment.
WIRS2 has been used in three studies and these are summarised in table
7.  Machin and Wadhwani (1991) examined the incidence of different forms of
investment between 1981 and 1984.  Advanced technical change incorporates
micro-electronics whereas the conventional variety does not.  Previously Daniel
(1987) noted from cross-tabulations that unionised workplaces undertook more
of both types of investment than non-union workplaces in the early 1980s.
This raw positive correlation is explained by Machin and Wadhwani
(1991) by three factors operating in the early 1980s.  First, unionised
workplaces had higher pay than non-union workplaces, which directly
encouraged greater investment.  Second, unionised workplaces were
experiencing more organizational change -- particularly the elimination of
restrictive practices -- than non-union workplaces.  Such organization change
frequently went hand-in-hand with more investment.  Third, union voice has
a background role in the higher investment via more formalised consultative
procedures.
Latreille (1992) considers whether or not the workplace has ever
invested in microelectronic technology (rather than such investment just
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between 1981-84) by studying its use.  Workplaces where unions were
recognised were 12% more likely to use such equipment than non-union
workplaces.  A similar conclusion emerges from the more detailed case studies
of Litner et al. (1987).
Denny and Nickell (1991, 1992) get the most clear-cut union effects.
Their sample is drawn from manufacturing industries and incorporates
information on industrial relations variables from WIRS1 and 2.  They find, for
1980-84, that union recognition depresses investment, but that this adverse
effect is offset as density rises.  However, even 100% density does not
completely counter the negative recognition effect.  By implication, they point
out that the worst possible situation is union recognition but with only a small
fraction of the workforce being union members.  Fortunately, this is rather
rare.  Voice effects are also apparent -- where many workers are covered by
joint consultative councils (whether in union or non-union workplaces)
investment rates are higher.
Thus three studies use information from WIRS to analyse the link
between unionisation and investment.  Two show, essentially, a positive
association, while one reports both positive and negative links with the latter
dominating.  Unfortunately, time series evidence is rather inconsistent with
these results. Manning (1987) and Wadhwani and Wall (1989) both report no
significant associations. Denny and Nickell (1992) and Tsamourgelis (1990)
disclose that union recognition and mark-ups (respectively) are negatively
associated with investment.  It is interesting to note, however, that such effects
are attenuated in the 1980s compared to the 1960s and 1970s.  By the mid
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1980s the adverse association between recognition and investment was halved
compared with a decade earlier.
It is clear, even from this brief survey, that the link between
unionisation and investment is complex.  The evidence is mixed but there is,
at worst, no strong evidence of British unions adversely affecting investment
in the 1980s or 1990s.  And, if anything, unionised workplaces use more, and
invest more in, advanced capital equipment and human capital than do their
non-union equivalents.  Thus the quote at the beginning of this section from
the DE Green Paper on Trade Union Immunities probably no longer holds (if it
ever did) concerning the link between unions and investment.  This is not
really surprising:  investment is the change in capital stock and the evidence
above suggests that unions are more likely to impact on levels (of pay,
productivity, etc.) than on changes in these variables.
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7 Summary and Conclusions
There can be no doubt that the institutions and processes of British 
industrial relations changed fundamentally in the last decade or so.  In part I
it was shown that:
* Union membership haemorrhaged.  The 14-year 3 million free-fall in
membership since 1979 is the longest ever period of decline.  The closed
shop is almost extinct and new recognitions are rare.  It should be
noted, however, that 2-employees-in-5 still belong to a union, an
impressive figure by international standards.
* Management prerogatives were restored.  Management often extricated
itself from previous pluralist arrangements involving joint regulation
with unions.  There was some spread of human resource management
practices, mainly in unionised workplaces, but they have a shallow
hold.  More importantly collective agreements were altered to
emphasise greater flexibility of work organisation.
* Under half of employees are now covered by collective agreements
compared with nearly three quarters in the mid-1970s.  Where collective
bargaining remains 4-in-5 employees are now covered by single
employer agreements, reflecting the virtual collapse of multi-employer
national agreements.  Simultaneously the fragmentation of bargaining
inside the company has been moderated:  most multi-plant employers
now bargain at company rather than workplace level.
* The industrial relations environment has become harsher.  Each
successive peak of unemployment reaches a new higher level.  Product
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market competition has intensified.  State subsidies to lame duck,
monopolistic, highly unionised firms have been axed.  Legislative
changes have undermined collectivism by promoting individual
responsibility, voice, exit from collective agreements, and loyalty to the
company.
Thus the institutional structure and the conduct of industrial relations have
probably been "transformed" as the Secretary of State for Employment claimed
in 1990.  But what of the performance outcomes?  Here the story is very
different.
In the 1960s and 1970s industrial relations were seen to be central to our
economic performance.  Our system of labour relations was subject to varieties
of social engineering in the 1970s -- for example, pluralism in the workplace,
corporatism at national level, a stress on institutions and procedures -- but the
emphasis remained on collective relations.  By contrast, the 1980s witnessed
the rise of individualism and the rule of the market.  This certainly altered
company performance.  In particular, any adverse links between union
presence and productivity, financial performance and investment were
weakened in the 1980s:  it may well be that unionised workplaces now have
higher levels of labour productivity and investment than their non-union
counterparts.  The industrial relations system -- particularly concerning union
presence -- can no longer be held to stymie companies' achievements.
Changes in the environment -- the legislative onslaught, greater competition
and higher unemployment -- reduced any monopoly effects of unions on
company and workplace performance.  But this is surely not a
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"transformation".  The changed outcomes seem to be mainly the result of
compliance by labour in the conduct of workplace relations.  What is still
needed for a transformation is a change of gear by management -- greater
emphasis on co-operation and more investment in physical and human capital.
The impact of changes in industrial relations institutions and processes
on the pay/jobs trade-off are even more acutely depressing.  The pay-setting
institutions have certainly been transformed:  fewer workers are in collective
agreements, bargaining is decentralised, the century-old tradition of "the rate
for the job" has been ruptured, Fair Wage Resolutions and comparability
machinery have been withdrawn, there is greater sensitivity to the fortunes of
the company and the performance of the individual.  The government and
their acolytes have achieved virtually all they set out to do yet unemployment
rises inexorably to a post-war record high.
Here there can only be two conclusions.  Either the government got it
wrong concerning the link between pay-setting institutions and procedures
and the employment outcomes.  If so, the emphasis on individual and
company performance and the undermining of collective organisation should
be reversed.  Instead, there should be greater stress on a national economic
assessment and co-ordination and synchronization of bargaining.
Alternatively, the government got it right about pay setting.  In this case its
macroeconomic policy must be a shambles.  Either way it is a tragedy that
more than 3 million unemployed are needed to implement government policy.
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TABLE 1
Trade Union Membership (thousands) and Density (%)
UK GB TUC GB
(1) (2) (3) (4)
corrected affiliated density
1960 9,835 8,852 8,299 41.3
1965 10,181 9,163 8,868 40.5
1970 11,178 10,060 10,002 48.2
1975 12,184 10,966 11,063 49.4
1979 13,289 11,960 12,173 52.9
1985 10,821 9,739 9,581 46.6
1990 9,947 8,952 8,230 40.0
Membership 3,342 3,008 3,943 (3,608) 12.9
loss
1979-90
Notes and Sources:
(1) Membership of UK trade unions.  Annual article in Employment Gazette (e.g.
April 1992, p. 187)  Information supplied by unions themselves to the
Certification Officer.
(2) Union membership among employees in employment in Great Britain.  This
is derived from Column 1, suitably corrected.  It is necessary to deduct:
(a) self employed and unemployed,
(b) members in Northern Ireland and overseas.
10% of union members as defined in Column 1 fall into categories (a) and (b),
so Column 1 is multiplied by 0.9.  It should be noted that unions may either
over-report their membership (e.g. to boost their importance in the TUC and
Labour party) or under-report (to reduce affiliation fees).  No full information
exists on the direction of bias and no correction is made.
(3) Membership of unions affiliated to the TUC as supplied by the unions
themselves.  Figure in brackets is for information.  It "adds back" EETPU
membership to control for the expulsion of the EETPU in 1988.
(4) Column 2 as a percentage of GB employees in employment, Employment
Gazette, table 1.2.
TABLE 2
Union Presence 1984 and 1990
Indicator 1984 1990
% %
1. Recognition
Establishments with recognized trade unions for any workers as % 66 53
of all establishments
2. Density (% of all employees who were union members)
All employees 58 48
Manual 66 53
Non-manual 61 43
Private manufacturing 56 48
Private services 30 27
Public sector 80 72
3. Multiple unions (number of recognized unions, excluding
workplaces with no recognized unions)
Manual
1 65 66
2 21 19
3+ 14 15
Non-manual
1 39 45
2 28 31
3+ 33 23
4. Closed Shop
Number of employees (millions) 3.6 0.4
% of establishments where all or some groups have to be union
members
Manual 20 4
Non-manual 9 1
Note: Information based on representative sample of some 2,000 workplaces with 25+
employees in 1984 and 1990.
Source: Millward et al. (1992) tables 3.7, 3.2, 3.8, 3.9, 3.17.
TABLE 3
Changes in Payment Systems
% of establishments with
1984 1990
1. Payments by Results
Any worker paid by results on individual, group
or organizational basis
Manual 31 32
Clerical, administrative, secretarial 16 19
2. Individual payments: any worker with:
Individual PBR n.a. 27
Merit Pay n.a. 34
Either n.a. 45
3. Profit sharing
Cash-based or share-based profit sharing, 18 43
establishments in industrial and commercial sectors
4. Employee Share Ownership Schemes
Share ownership or share option schemes 23 32
Eligibility: % of workforce eligible where schemes 68 62
exist
Participation: % of workforce participating 22 34
Note: See note to table 2.
Source: Millward et al. (1992) tables 7.19, 7.20, pages 264, 265.
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